In using approval voting to elect multiple winners to a committee or council, it is desirable that excess votes-approvals beyond those that a candidate needs to win a seat-not be wasted. The excess method does this by sequentially allocating excess votes to a voter's as-yet-unelected approved candidates, based on the Jefferson method of apportionment. It is monotonic-approving of a candidate never hurts and may help him or her get elected-computationally easy, and less manipulable than related methods. In parliamentary systems with party lists, the excess method is equivalent to the Jefferson method and thus ensures the approximate proportional representation of political parties.
Introduction
In electing a voting body, the proportional representation (PR) of different interests is usually an important goal: Preferences and opinions should be represented in the body roughly proportional to their presence in the electorate. But instead of restricting voters to voting for one candidate or party, we propose that they be given greater flexibility in expressing their preferences by being able to vote for multiple candidates or parties, using approval voting. 1 We begin by focusing on the election of individual candidates to a committee or council, who need not be affiliated with a political party. Later we turn to the election of members of political parties in proportion to their numbers of supporters in the electorate.
Instead of simply summing the approval votes that each candidate receives in order to determine winners, we propose to modify a well-known apportionment method, proposed independently by Thomas Jefferson and Viktor d'Hondt, to depreciate the votes of voters who have succeeded in getting one or more of their approved candidates already elected (Brill et al., 2018; Brams et al., 2018) .
2 This tends to ensure that voters with different backgrounds or interests receive a proportional share of seats on a committee or council.
3 1 Under approval voting, voters do not rank candidates or parties but simply express their approval for those they like or find acceptable; where voters draw the line between acceptable and nonacceptable we assume is a subjective judgment they make. 2 On a committee or council, diversity may be more important than PR. As a case in point, one would not want all members of a university grievance committee to come from the same department or be of the same gender. Ratliff (2014) and Bredereck et al. (2018) analyze constraints of this kind. 3 Apportionment methods can be used for other purposes. For example, in the United States, they are used to determine the number of seats in the House of Representatives to which each state, based on its population, is entitled.
uses votes that would otherwise be wasted on candidates who do not need them to help voters' other approved candidates get elected.
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2 we describe the Jefferson apportionment method-the most commonly used of the so-called divisor apportionment methods-which we modify to incorporate excess approvals that are not needed by a candidate to win (the same modification can be applied to other divisor methods).
In section 3, we illustrate the excess method with two simple examples and discuss different ways of allocating excess votes. We show that allocating excess votes to other approved but yet-to-be elected candidates respects voter sovereignty and voter equality, abetting the election of less popular but deserving candidates. We also illustrate its vulnerability to subset manipulation.
In section 4, we define more formally the excess method. We illustrate in detail its calculations with an example in which more than two candidates are elected.
In section 5, we compare the excess method with other multiwinner voting rules that are based on similar ideas-specifically, single transferable vote (STV) and a method developed by Lars Edvard Phragmén (Janson, 2016) . We give reasons why we think the excess methods is preferable to other PR systems.
In section 6, we show how the excess method, when applied to the election of political parties, is equivalent to the Jefferson method, electing members of parties approximately proportional to the numbers of approvals, some depreciated, that the parties receive. We also illustrate how it can be manipulated through a form of subset manipulation. We argue, however, that there will not generally be sufficient information to make strategic calculations feasible.
In section 7, we conclude that the excess method, by passing on excess votes to
as-yet-unelected approved candidates, helps to ensure that a voters' approvals are not wasted but, generally speaking, used effectively. Applied to political parties, there is no excess, because additional approvals are simply used to elect more party members. But allowing voters to vote for more than one party in a party-list system is likely to encourage coordination among political parties with overlapping interests, fostering consensus rather than partisan bickering.
The Jefferson Apportionment Method
The development and use of apportionment methods has a rich history. It is vividly recounted, mostly in the U.S. case, by Balinski and Young (1982/2001) , wherein its best-known application has been to the apportionment of members of the House of Representatives according to the populations of the states. In the case of most parliamentary democracies in Europe and elsewhere, these methods have been applied to the apportionment of parliamentary seats to political parties according to the numbers of votes they receive in an election (Pukelsheim, 2014 (Pukelsheim, /2018 .
Other jurisdictions in the United States 5 and parliaments around the world 6 use divisor methods of apportionment, of which there are exactly five that lead to stable apportionments (Balinski and Young, 1982/2001) : No transfer of a seat from one state or party to another can produce less disparity in apportionment, where "disparity" is measured in five different ways (there are other ways of measuring disparity, but they do not produce the stable apportionments of a divisor method). One of the five ways of defining disparity yields the Jefferson method, which we describe next.
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Although originally devised for allocating seats to states based on their populations, or to parties based on the votes they receive, apportionment methods can also be used to allocate seats to individual candidates based on approval voting. This was first pointed out by the Danish polymath Thorvald N. Thiele (1895) ; see the survey by Janson (2016) .
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As noted in section 1, voters approve a subset of candidates or parties Fishburn, 1983/2007; Laslier and Sanver, 2010) , obviating the need to rank them (e.g., as under single transferable vote, discussed in section 5).
We start with the election of individual candidates to a committee or council;
later, in section 6, we describe the application of the Jefferson method to political parties.
It works by iteratively depreciating the value of a voter's approvals as more and more of his or her approved candidates are elected. The sequential versions of these methods, which are the standard ones, give one seat on each round to the candidate, i, who maximizes a deservingness function, d(i).
7 Balinski and Young (1982/2001) argue that the Jefferson method is preferable to the most prominent alternative divisor method, due to Daniel Webster and André Saint-Laguë, used to apportion seats to political parties, because it somewhat favors larger parties and thereby inhibits the fractionalization of party systems. 8 What we call the Jefferson method is often referred to in the literature as sequential proportional approval voting (SPAV) or reweighted approval voting (RAV); a nonsequential version of proportional approval voting is referred to as PAV (Aziz et al., 2017) . These authors show that PAV, but not SPAV, satisfies "justified representation" and "extended justified representation." For more on the history of apportionment, see Brill et al. (2018) , who discuss, in particular, the contributions of Thiele and another Scandinavian mathematician, Lars Edvard Phragmén-some of whose work we turn to later-as does Janson (2016) . (Balinski and Young, 1982/2001; Pukelsheim, 2014 Pukelsheim, /2018 . 
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Example 1 illustrates that after one of a voter's approved candidates is elected, the voter's approvals for a second candidate are cut by a factor of 2, and then more and more as additional approved candidates are elected. The same sequence can be used as the basis for a nonsequential method of committee election (Thiele, 1895; Janson, 2016) , but it is not applicable to the excess method, because the excess is determined round-byround.
The Excess Method Applied to Jefferson
We next illustrate the application of the excess method to apportionments given by the Jefferson method. We focus on two simple examples-to convey the intuition behind the excess method-and later, in section 4, we provide a formal definition of the method and illustrate it with an example that requires more than two rounds to determine the winners.
As in Example 1, we begin with a voter profile, which specifies the number of voters who approve of different subsets of candidates. From this profile, we calculate the approval scores of all the candidates, just as in the 1 st round of the Jefferson method. The winner of the 1 st round is the candidate with the highest approval score.
Define the excess of the winner as the number of votes, beyond a tie, by which he or she wins. That is, the excess is the difference in approval scores between the candidate with the most approvals and the candidate with the second-most approvals. (If two or more candidates tie for the maximal approval score, the excess is 0.) For example, if candidate A gets 10 approvals, candidate B gets 7 approvals, and all other candidates receive less than 7 approvals, then A would win with an excess of 10 -7 = 3 votes.
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The excess thus equals the number of approvals that could be taken away from the winner without changing the winning candidate (up to a tie). If the excess is 3, as in our example, this means that up to 3 voters approving of A could safely change their ballots by omitting A; this would not hurt A, who would still be elected first, but it could potentially help other candidates, approved by A voters, get elected later. Put differently, the excess equals the number of voters who can safely engage in subset manipulationby transferring their votes to other approved candidates-without changing the current winner.
The idea underlying the excess method is that the method itself carries out a form of subset manipulation-on behalf of the voters who approve of multiple candidateswithout requiring those voters to make strategic choices. When there is a positive excess e > 0, then the excess method chooses e of the voters who approve of the winner and treats them, in future rounds, as if they did not approve of the winner.
We assume the excess is distributed to all candidates, other than A, whom A voters approve of; this distribution is proportional to the sizes of the voter subsets approving of A. We illustrate this calculation in the next example. Because this excess is small, we will ignore it for now and then assess whether it would have made a difference in the outcome. Applying standard Jefferson, the deservingness scores for B and C are as follows: The approval scores of A, B, and C, respectively, are 25, 15, and 11. Therefore, A is chosen on the 1 st round with an excess of 25 -15 = 10 votes, which go to the A, AB and AC voters in the proportion 5:15:5 = 1:3:1. This translates to
• (1/5)(10) = 2 excess votes to the A voters;
• (3/5)(10) = 6 excess votes to the AB voters;
• (1/5)(10) = 2 excess votes to the AC voters.
Because there is no other approved candidate to whom the 5 A voters can pass on their excess, however, the allocation of 2 votes to A is fictitious. Allocating the remaining excess of 6 votes of the 15 AB voters and 2 votes of the 5 AC voters in the ratio of 3:1 to B and C-after subtracting the 6 excess votes from the 15 AB voters and the 2 excess votes from the 5 AC voters, who provide the excess-we have the following updated voter profile:
On the 2 nd round, the deservingness scores of B and C are as follows:
B: (9)(1/2) + (6)(1) = 10 1/2; C: (3)(1/2) + (8)(1) = 9 1/2, Hence, B is the 2 nd candidate elected, yielding AB as the outcome.
Compare this outcome with that for standard Jefferson, in which AC would have won because of the 6 C voters in the original profile, who more than counterbalance the more numerous 15 AB-compared with the 5 AC-voters. As in Example 2, the excess method gives a sufficiently big boost to B on the 2 nd round so that he or she beats C for the 2 nd seat.
We assumed in Example 3 that none of the excess from the 5 A voters goes to B or C, because the A voters did not indicate any other candidate of whom they approved.
As an alternative assumption, we could have assumed that the entire excess of 10 votes (instead of the 8 votes that come from AB and AC voters) goes to B and C in the ratio 15:5 = 3:1. This would result in allocating (3/4)(10) = 7 1/2 excess votes to B and
(1/4)(10) = 2 1/2 excess votes to C. One advantage of this approach is that none of the excess is wasted, including that which comes from the A voters.
However, there are two serious problems with this approach. First, it violates voter sovereignty-the 5 A voters offered no indication of a preference between B and C, much less that they favored B over C by a factor of 3.
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We think voter sovereignty 13 We could make this "support transfer" explicit by informing voters that if there are candidates whom they have not approved of after all their approved candidate(s) have been elected-as occurred with the A voters in Example 3-the excess method will attribute approval in the transfer process proportional to the approval of A voters who approved of other candidates. 
Rules of the Excess Method
Although the calculations of the excess method, as illustrated by Examples 2 and 3, are more complicated than those of standard Jefferson, the application of the method is in fact quite simple, based on the following five rules:
1. Voters submit their approvals for subsets of candidates. If k candidates are to be elected, there are k rounds of voting and up to k-1 transfers after the 1 st round.
2. The candidate elected on the 1 st round, A, is the approval-vote winner (if there is a tie, it is broken randomly). The difference between A's approval and B's, the candidate with the second-most approvals, is the excess (which is zero if there is a tie).
3. On the 2 nd round, the excess is distributed to subsets of voters who approved of A in proportion to their contributions to A's deservingness score. The excess part of the subset comprises all approved candidates other than A; the remaining part includes A.
This dichotomization of A-subsets, one containing and the other not containing
A-plus the subsets of voters voting for other candidates-provides an updated voter profile. Applying the Jefferson method to this updated profile yields new deservingness scores for the remaining not-yet-elected candidates, which determines a winner on the 2 nd round.
5. Steps 2 -4 are repeated for the 3 rd round, with the winner from the 2 nd round replacing A in the determination of the deservingness scores of the 3 rd -round winner. This iterative process is repeated until k candidates are elected.
To summarize the excess method, after A is elected, the excess that A did not need to tie the 2 nd -place candidate goes to subsets of candidates approved of by A voters. On each subsequent round, A is replaced by a new winner, whose excess is passed on to the not-yet-elected candidates who approved of that winner.
In Examples 2 and 3, after the election of A on the 1 st round, the excess on the 2 nd round was distributed to other candidates supported by A voters (B and C in the case of AB and AC voters) in proportion to the sizes of voter subsets that supported A. These proportions determined the contributions of these subsets to A's support.
But on later rounds, after the excesses on earlier rounds are transferred, the size and composition of voter subsets change. These are reflected in updated voter profiles, which determine a winner on each round, his or her excess, and transfers to subsets who approved of the winner to not-yet-elected candidates.
These transfers depend not only on the size of the subsets of candidates to which they are transferred but also on which members of the subset have already been elected.
To illustrate, assume there is a subset of 6 ABC voters. On the 1 st round, if A is elected, the contribution of ABC to A's victory will be (6)(1) = 6, because none of the ABC candidates had been previously elected, and similarly for the contributions of other subsets of voters who approved of A.
On the 2 nd round, assume that B wins the next seat, and the updated voter profile now includes 3 ABC voters. Then the contribution of these voters to B's victory will be depreciated to (3)(1/2) = 1 1/2, because one of the ABC candidates (i.e., A) had been previously elected. This will be the contribution of the ABC voters to the excess of the 2 nd winner, B, which will be distributed to subsets of voters who approved of B.
When the excess method is used to elect candidates after the 2 nd round, as specified by rule 5, the excess will similarly be distributed to all subsets of voters that include the candidate just elected. Whereas updated voter profiles specify the sizes of the current voter subsets, the already elected candidates determine how much each subset is depreciated and, therefore, contributes to the new winner's victory. Both factors determine the deservingness scores of the unelected candidates and, therefore, who wins on each round.
In our next example, we illustrate all the rules of the excess method, which requires three rounds to elect three candidates. As in Examples 2 and 3, the method gives a different set of winners from those of standard Jefferson. • (1/8)(15) = 1 7/8 excess votes to A voters, which go to no other candidate and so are fictitious;
• (1/2)(15) = 7 1/2 excess votes to AB voters, which go to B;
• (1/4)(15) = 3 3/4 excess votes to AC, which go to C;
• (1/8)(15) = 1 7/8 excess votes to ABC, which go to BC. Hence, C wins the 3 rd seat, making the outcome ABC.
As in Example 3, we assume that the excess votes to
Under standard Jefferson, the outcome would have been ACD rather than ABC, with C rather than B winning on the 2 nd round. More significantly, D would have won on the 3 rd round, rendering the set of winners-not just the order in which they are electeddifferent.
In effect, the excess methods boosts B on the 2 nd round and enables C to win on the 3 rd round, each of whom benefits from A's excess on the 1 st round. D receives no such benefit, because his 12 supporters (20% of the total) are all bullet voters.
We hesitate to say that the excess method "improves" on standard Jefferson, because an argument can be made that the 20% whom only D represents deserve to have some representation in a 3-member voting body. Instead, we emphasize that the excess method takes into account that A is a shoo-in, obtaining approval from 40 voters (2/3 of the 60 voters).
Because A voters can rest assured that A's excess will not be wasted but will be put to good use to help elect their other approved candidates, they have little incentive to strategize.
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To be sure, the excess method is not strategyproof, as we illustrated in Example 2, but it certainly attenuates the need to vote strategically. 16 If A did not have a big excess (say, only 1 more vote than B), then B and C would not be significantly helped, enabling D to win a seat in a modified Example 4.
Comparison with Other Methods
It is instructive to compare standard and excess Jefferson with other methods that have been proposed to elect multiple winners to a committee or a council. The most well-known method is the Hare system of single transferable vote (STV). STV was developed independently in the 1850s by two prominent figures-Thomas Hare of England and Carl Christoffer Georg Andrae of Denmark-and it was praised by such distinguished political theorists as John Stuart Mill (1861 Mill ( /1991 , who placed it "among the greatest improvements yet made in the theory and practice of government."
STV has been widely used in public and private elections to elect (i) single winners to offices, such as a president or a prime minister, and (ii) multiple winners to voting bodies. While there are several variations of STV, all assume that voters rank candidates; if more than one candidate is to be elected, the candidates who reach a "quota"-the most common being the Droop quota-are chosen.
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More specifically, STV progressively eliminates candidates who receive the fewest first-choice votes and transfers their votes to voters' next-lower-ranked candidates, with these eliminations and transfers culminating when some candidate achieves a quota. When more than one candidate is to be elected, STV on each round selects the candidate with the most votes and transfers so-called surplus votes to the nextlower-ranked candidates. Surplus votes are similar in spirit to excess votes, except that they are defined with respect to a fixed quota instead of the difference in votes of the two biggest vote-getters-which changes from round to round-under the excess method.
Compared with the excess method, in which voters can approve of a subset of candidates but do not rank them, STV has several practical and theoretical drawbacks:
1. Voters often have difficulty ranking more than a few candidates, whereas expressing approval for multiple candidates is relatively easy.
2. STV is nonmonotonic-a voter may hurt a candidate by ranking him or her higher-just the opposite of what one would expect. But expressing approval for a candidate never hurts and may help him or her get elected. 3. STV is vulnerable to the no-show paradox-voters may benefit from not voting-whereas not voting can never benefit voters in an approval-voting election.
4. STV may eliminate candidates who otherwise could win if they had remained in the race, whereas the excess method, which never eliminates unelected candidates, ensures that all candidates remain viable.
Interestingly, the quota-based surplus approach motivating STV can also be applied to approval ballots, using a method proposed by Swedish mathematician Lars Edvard Phragmén (Janson, 2016, section 18.5) .
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It employs the Hare quota, which is similar to the Droop quota.
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Phragmén's method successively elects candidates with the greatest voting weights, updating these weights after each round. Initially, every voter has a voting weight of 1. The voting weight of a candidate is the sum of the voting weights of all voters approving of this candidate.
Let A be the candidate with the greatest voting weight; on the 1 st round, this candidate is the approval-vote winner. Consequently, A is elected on the 1 st round, and • B: 31/3 + 31/12 = 12 11/12;
• C: 6 + 31/6 + 31/12 = 13 3/4;
• D: 12.
Thus, C is elected on the 2 nd round. Since the voting weight of C does not exceed the quota, the voting weights of all voters approving of C are updated to 0. In section 6, we apply the excess method to the election of political parties, each of which may win multiple seats. We also illustrate how it can be manipulated, though doing so is probably well-nigh impossible for reasons that we will discuss.
Application of the Excess Method to Parties
When applying standard Jefferson to the apportionment of seats to political parties in a legislature, according to the numbers of votes they receive, voters are assumed to vote for only one party. But if they can approve of as many parties as they like, how would the apportionment of seats to parties work?
To calculate the numbers of seats that parties receive, we assume that each party nominates as many candidates, s, as will be elected to the legislature and does so in a particular order. Thus, party I nominates candidates i1, i2, …, is; if an apportionment method allocates k ≤ s seats to I, they go to its top k candidates i1, i2, …, ik. We assume that a voter who votes for a party approves of all its candidates.
The following example, which appears in Brams et al. (2018) Each of the three candidates of parties A, B, and C receives, respectively, 12, 9, and 8 approvals. Thus, candidate a1 is the first candidate elected under standard Jefferson. On the 2 nd round, we compare the deservingness scores for a2 (since a1 has already been elected from party A), b1 (from party B), and c1 (from party C). These scores are a2: 7(1/2) + 5(1/2) = 6; b1: 7(1/2) + 2(1) = 5 1/2; c1: 5(1/2) + 3(1) = 5 1/2, so a2, who receives the greatest score, is the 2 nd candidate elected, making the winning pair a1a2.
In fact, excess Jefferson does not change these results. Why? Because at the conclusion of a round, another member of the party that just won a seat receives exactly the same number of votes, so there is no excess. In particular, this is true for party A at the end of the 1 st round (a2 receives the same number of votes as the winner, a1), and this equality would hold true if there were additional candidates to be elected. In determining winners with party voting, therefore, excess Jefferson and standard Jefferson are equivalent.
When voting is for individual candidates, as we showed for Example 2, voting is not strategyproof. Is this also true when voting is for parties? We show that it may be, though in a special sense.
Consider the outcome, a1a2 in Example 5. Assume that polls just before the election show that party A is a shoo-in to win one seat (a1) and possibly two (a1a2). If you are one of the 5 AC voters and would prefer a more diverse committee comprising a1c1 instead of a1a2, you might well consider voting for just C to boost the chances of c1 winning the 2 nd seat.
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In that case, the votes for the following subsets of candidates would be 7: a1a2b1b2 4: a1a2c1c2 2: b1b2 4: c1c2.
Each of the two candidates of parties A, B, and C would receive, respectively, 11, 9, and 7 approvals. As before, candidate a1 would be the first candidate elected. On the 2 nd round, the deservingness scores for a2, b1, and c1 are a2: (7)(1/2) + (4)(1/2) = 5 1/2; b1: (7)(1/2) + (2)(1) = 5 1/2; c1: (4)(1/2) + (4)(1) = 6, so c1 is the 2 nd candidate elected, making the winning pair a1c1 and demonstrating that sincerity is not a Nash equilibrium in Example 5.
That strategic voting may be optimal is, of course, not surprising, because virtually all voting systems are vulnerable to manipulation. What complicates matters in the case of the apportionment methods is that the determination of winners, and therefore optimal strategies to produce a preferred outcome, is anything but straightforward. This makes it difficult to use information from polls or other sources to determine optimal strategic choices , offer experimental evidence on manipulability).
Conclusions
If the depreciation calculations of standard Jefferson are simpler than excess
Jefferson, why do we think the excess version is superior? In electing individual candidates to committees and councils, the excess method eliminates wasted votes, especially of shoo-ins, that may lead to different winners.
It, therefore, largely relieves voters of the need to make difficult strategic choices.
More specifically, it provides them with some assurance that their excess votes will be used to help their other approved candidates, which may well encourage them to approve of additional candidates. In turn, this may encourage the formation of coalitions that cross ideological and party lines, reducing cleavages and promoting consensus in voting bodies.
The excess method does not relieve voters of the need to think carefully about whom they consider acceptable and wish to approve. This task is usually less arduous when the contestants are political parties rather than individuals, because parties are more likely to formulate platforms and promulgate their positions.
Because parties win seats in proportion to their votes and so do not accumulate excess votes in parliamentary elections, the excess method is equivalent to the Jefferson method. In applying the Jefferson method to approval votes, parties will have an incentive to coordinate their policies with ideologically similar parties to accommodate voters who like more than one (perhaps for different reasons). Promoting their common interests to voters in campaigns will facilitate the formation of both coherent and more stable governing coalitions in parliaments.
In theory, the excess method is vulnerable to subset manipulation. But in practice this does not seem to be a serious problem, because acquiring the information and making the calculations required to successfully manipulate an election is exceedingly difficult, especially when other candidates or parties may be making similar calculations and not act sincerely.
Approval voting is much less demanding of voters than having to rank candidates or political parties, as required by voting systems like STV that, in addition, are susceptible to some well-known voting paradoxes that standard and excess approvalvoting methods are not. While Phragmén's method uses approval votes, like STV it postulates a fixed quota, whereas it seems more natural to make the election threshold variable-a function of the number of votes that a candidate needs to win a seat on each round.
Recall that the Jefferson method makes the criterion for getting elected on each round the deservingness scores of candidates. The excess method carries Jefferson one step further by incorporating into these scores the votes that previously elected candidates did not need in order to be elected. We think this is preferable to using an exogenous threshold, such as the Droop or Hare quota, which ignores the wasted votes of candidates.
In this paper, we analyzed one particular way of calculating and allocating excess votes. Other definitions are conceivable (and defensible); this situation is similar to that of different versions of STV, for which Tideman (1995, p. 37 ) noted a tradeoff between sophistication and comprehensibility.
We defined the excess of the winner on a given round as the number of votes a candidate could afford to lose and still win on that round. If the candidate were to lose more votes, he or she would not win on that round but might still be elected on a later
round.
An alternative concept of excess could be based on the number of votes an elected candidate can afford to lose and still be elected on some round. While appealing in theory, such a definition would be much harder to operationalize. Because the excess method, as proposed in this paper, defines excess with reference to the current round, it is well-suited to scenarios in which the order in which candidates are elected matters-in particular, when being elected earlier is preferable to being elected later (Skowron et al., 2017) .
The idea behind the excess method is readily applicable to other sequential multiwinner procedures that use approval ballots, including, but not limited to, other divisor apportionment methods. Indeed, for a wide range of multiwinner voting procedures, incorporating the excess into voting outcomes alleviates both the problem of wasted votes and the possibility of subset manipulation.
